What does the Biden Administration want from Pakistan? | Syed Talat Hussain

Syed Talat Hussain

In the short-term, which is the dominant concern, Washington wants a smooth, bloodless, uncomplicated withdrawal of soldiers and sinews of its $2-trillion war from Afghanistan. It is positioning its air and sea-based resources to remove any hurdle that could subvert the process, but would obviously need Pakistan’s full assurance that it will extend a helping hand (both hands in fact) and commit to dealing with complexities that might pop up. Pakistan is saying “yes”. It wants all lines of withdrawal to stay open and secure through Pakistan’s jurisdiction. Pakistan is saying “sure”.  It also wants the Taliban to behave while it winds up its tent. Pakistan is expected to take the lead in achieving this goal. Pakistan is saying, “trying our best.” 

It also wants Pakistan to do intelligence sharing far more deeply than it has done so far. Withdrawal means less intel gathering capacity (other than that capacity that is tech-based). Pakistan is expected to be a sport and fill in the gaps where-ever these might occur. Pakistan is saying… ummm.., “yes, may be, yes”.

Short-to-medium expectations are trickier. These relate to Washington’s long-view of the region. It is yet to be formed fully but its core principle remains clear. Washington does not want Afghanistan specifically and the region generally to become its policy blind-spot. It will keep a very close eye on and considerable power projection assets nearby the area. In this regard expects Pakistan to be “positively neutral” towards its concerns and balance its interests with China in such a way that it does not disbalance US policy objectives. Pakistan is saying, “let us think but don’t take it as no.” 

Given the urgency of these goals, the Biden Administration has cut to the chase and has created the usual one-window engagement with the Army. As usual we are delighted!  It has bypassed the broken and disorderly civilian set-up led by prime minister Imran Khan who is hopelessly cut off from the real world and wastefully wallows in his wonderland. Washington has used its connection with GHQ to hammer out the nuts and bolts of the ongoing implementation phase. The Pakistan foreign office is a mere post-box in this engagement. It is between Pindi-Abpara and the Biden Administration’s local, regional and Washington-based emissaries. 

As always Washington does not want to be on hold on any of its needs and wants quick response. Not for the first time those in Pakistan dealing with Washington think they can “optimize” this opportunity and maximize “advantages”. There is much excitement all around about getting “purposefully engaged with Washington” and getting them to understand “our perspective”. 

The excitement is childish. Even though our experience with Washington is akin to Groundhog Day---reliving the same cycle of hopes and fears over and over again---clearly it has not taught us a thing. It is a big castle in the air to think that Washington is about to revive Strategic Dialogue with Pakistan or that any such dialogue can actually be based on something strategic. The Strategic Dialogue of yore didn’t yield much even though the Americans were knee-deep in Afghanistan and had a long axe to grind in indulging Pakistan. Salala and OBL ops showed the limits of “deeper understanding” and “trust-building” for a long-term relationship offering bliss. The Raymond Davis episode showed that friendship does not mean secret operations will cease and secret operators will cease to operate. If you could only listen to General Kiani and US National Security Advisor phone call ---it must be somewhere in the records--- after the OBL raid, you would understand how one event can tear into years of mutual understanding. General Kiani spoke to the NSA like no one had ever before but it was all in vain. The deed was done. Reading the riot act to the NSA was a post facto catharsis that changed nothing. 

The OBL raid did not raise a moral question even though much of the heartbreak in Pindi was “look what they did to us”. The Obama Administration did what it deemed appropriate for its interests. State interests have no moral moorings. The incident, however, did raise a practical challenge: how to fit urgent needs, hidden policy goals, deep plans or unforeseen events into the framework of a durable friendship?  As we discovered that there is no way this could be done. Pak-US ties remain subject to vagaries of circumstances, most of which Pakistan does not control. 

The same will happen now. If Gen Kiani, a thinking general with a worldview and towering repute in the US, could not figure out a way to build shock-free relations with the US, it is very unlikely that this will happen now. The US does not face a clear and present danger at present and after it has left Afghanistan, the nature of its stakes will change drastically. So will Pakistan’s clout. The US is likely to use the stick of human rights, democracy, press freedom, minority rights, FATF, and a dozen other levers to press for Pakistan’s cooperation without incurring any big diplomatic cost. There is no reason for Washington to incentivize future cooperation. The sooner we realize this the more realistic our policy will become. 

But in the meanwhile Washington has to create some sort of a workable, friendly atmosphere to ensure that Pakistan stays in good humour, and continues to entertain the idea that something big, something substantive, something remarkable can be done between the two countries in this new phase. Americans are good at creating processes. They are brilliant with coinage (Friends of Pakistan Group!). As a veteran of Pakistan-US ties put it, “They see what pleases you and then reduce it to its bare bones before offering it you as the ultimate favour. A meeting at the White House. A telephone call. A message. A bouquet. They never concede on the fundamentals.” 

The more so if they see that those they are engaging with are desperate for a handshake and are caught up badly in their own net of economic and political turmoil. Pakistan does not have much bargaining position with Washington. And whatever position it has is being lost in the clumsy way Washington is being engaged. Most importantly, endless political engineering by our Einsteins has created a glorious mess at home which has divided the nation, conflicted institutions and has allowed big egos and small competence to amass power without transparency and accountability. Pakistan is being hollowed out from within. If we can see it, the Biden Administration reps can see it too. Washington’s future engagement with Pakistan will not just be based on its strength as a large coercive power that is used to making demands; it will be equally based on our own weaknesses and ineptitude, whose supply is endless.